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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control and monitor
services for the nation’s critical infrastructure. Recent cyber induced events (e.g.,
Stuxnet) provide an example of a targeted, covert cyber attack against a SCADA system
that resulted in physical effects. Of particular note is how Stuxnet exploited the trust
relationship between the human machine interface (HMI) and programmable logic
controllers (PLCs). Current methods for validating system operating parameters rely on
message exchange and network communications protocols, generally observed at the
HMI. Although sufficient at the macro level, this method does not provide detection of
malware that exhibits physical effects via covert manipulation of the PLC, as
demonstrated by Stuxnet. In this research, an alternative method that leverages direct
analysis of PLC input and output to derive the true state of SCADA end-devices is
introduced. The behavioral input-output characteristics are modeled using Petri nets to
derive metrics for quantifying resilient properties of systems against malicious exploits.
The results yield metrics that are applicable towards quantifying resilience in PLCs and
implementing real-time security solutions. These findings enable detecting programming
changes that affect input and output relationships, identifying the degree of deviation
from a baseline program, and minimizing performance losses against disruptive events.
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TOWARDS QUANTIFYING PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER
RESILIENCE AGAINST INTENTIONAL EXPLOITS

I. Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of this research. Section 1.1 introduces the
motivation; Section 1.2 provides the research goals; Section 1.3 describes an overview of
the research approach; Section 1.4 lists key assumptions and limitations; and Section 1.5
outlines the thesis organization.
1.1

Motivation
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems provide automated

control and monitoring for the nation’s critical infrastructure. Implemented in many
industry sectors as early as the 1960’s, security was not initially a priority for SCADA
design and development; however, recent intentional and unintentional events have
highlighted concerns associated with SCADA security (Stouffer, 2008). Non-intentional
events have traditionally been addressed with redundant and fault tolerant architectures.
However, current solutions for intentional malicious actions are not sufficient for
addressing the threat.
A primary risk factor associated with intentional malicious events is the trend to
incorporate business enterprise networks for cost saving purposes.

Indeed,

interconnecting critical systems via LAN and WAN technologies enables entry points for
attacks via the Internet, internal workstations, or communication links between the
control center and field sites (Stouffer, 2008). As demonstrated by Stuxnet, an attack can
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propagate via the enterprise network to execute code on field devices that results in
physical damage to the underlying system (Falliere, 2011).
Stuxnet is a recent example of an intentional malicious cyber event. Stuxnet
targeted a specific programmable logic controller (PLC) manufacturer and configuration.
PLCs control physical end-devices (e.g., sensors, pumps, motors, valves) at the edge of
SCADA systems. Stuxnet functionally alters the PLC’s parameters such that specific
drive motors were driven beyond nominal specifications (Falliere, 2011). Additionally,
Stuxnet masks modification of the PLCs functions from the SCADA system operator.
Stuxnet demonstrates a novel threat to SCADA security since it both altered physical
parameters to the system and concealed the modifications.
The Stuxnet example demonstrates SCADA systems are vulnerable to rootkit-like
exploits. Current methods of validating the functional parameters of a PLC primarily
consider the message exchange and network communications protocols, generally
observed at the human machine interface (HMI). Although sufficient at the macro level,
this method does not provide detection of malware which exhibits physical effects and
masks the operations from the HMI or communication channel.
Establishing a resilient SCADA system can help mitigate risks associated with
malicious exploits. Resiliency requires that a system be self-aware, robust and adaptive
(National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2009).

Additionally, determining the

resilience of a system requires that a system’s susceptibility to degradation and capability
to recover be quantifiable. Establishing a quantifiable measure of resilience for SCADA
systems is key to protecting critical infrastructure assets.

2

1.2

Research Statement
The goal of this research is to provide a method to quantify the identification and

absorption of malicious alterations by monitoring and characterizing field device inputs
and outputs to PLCs. By focusing on the field device at the micro level, intentional
malicious actions can be observed that otherwise would mask effects at the HMI, as was
the case in Stuxnet. This research investigates metrics that align with characteristics of
resilience. Traits such as self-awareness are a foundational characteristic of resilience
and may provide a basis for tangible mechanisms to maintain the integrity of a PLC’s
nominal functions in the presence of malicious events.
1.3

Research Approach
Establishing a metric to assess a PLC’s resilience requires both data that reflects

nominal PLC functionality and a definition of resilience which makes the metric
applicable. The data used for this research is derived from PLC simulations executed on
LogixPro® 500 software.

The definition for resilience is taken from the National

Infrastructure Advisory Council (2009).
The PLC simulations consist of various programs that emulate instances of a
PLC. Each PLC instance is subjected to malicious exploit test cases. The simulated PLC
programs are then observed for input-output behavior. The behavior is characterized into
formal Petri nets to facilitate analysis of the data and to allow for graphical and
mathematical analysis of defined system events (Zurawski, 1994).
This research establishes four program types for each instance. The first two
types of programs form two baselines for a PLC instance. The first baseline establishes
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the nominal ladder logic to execute a defined set of system processes. The second
baseline alters the original baseline’s ladder logic to protect against a known malicious
exploit. The second pair of programs is formed when attacks alter the logic of the first
two baselines. The formation of these four PLC programs forms the basis from which
equivalent Petri nets are derived.
The method of characterizing a PLC program via a Petri net is by defining the
inputs, outputs, and input-output interdependencies of the PLC program. The inputs of
the PLC program characterize the transitions between observable process events. The
outputs of the PLC program characterize the observable process events. The input-output
interdependencies characterize the association between the transitions and observable
process events. The resulting Petri nets allow for graphical and mathematical analysis of
the emulated PLC instances. These results facilitate identification of metrics which are
applicable to assessing resilience.
The Petri nets are created and simulated with PIPEv4.0 software. PIPEv4.0
allows for non-deterministic analysis of the Petri nets (Bonet, 2007).

The results

establish a set of tangible states and a reachability graph for each Petri net. The tangible
states and graphs are combined into a matrix which lists the input-output behavior for
each Petri net.

Comparative analysis of the matrices provides several metrics that

directly address, or indirectly support, the key aspects of resilience.
1.4

Assumptions/Limitations
In this research, the specific attack applied to the baseline program assumes

knowledge of the original baseline program. Similarly, the protective baseline program
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utilizes knowledge of the attack. These assumptions lead to the creation of four distinctly
defined program categories: (i) baseline, (ii) attack baseline, (iii) delta baseline, and (iv)
attack delta baseline. This research does not focus on ladder logic programming, but
rather seeks to identify measures for differentiating between programs of known
quantities.

By formulating known programs, the analysis is assured of presenting

findings consistent with true input-output behavior for a PLC system under nominal,
attack, and protected instances.
The Petri net’s simulation software, PIPEv4.0, has limited expressive capabilities.
Indeed, the drawing functions are limited to basic places, transitions, and arcs; however,
the software performs sufficient simulations and analysis for the instances presented. A
useful element not utilized in the experimentation is the presence of inhibitor arcs. Due
to the lack of inhibitor arcs, some Petri nets illustrate transitions which have similar, yet
unique, properties. For example, a transition labeled 10 to 8 signifies the same PLC input
sequence as a transition labeled 10to8; however, the next output state taken by the PLC is
determined by the current place(s) which is enabling the transition 10 to 8 (also 10to8).
Note that a labeled transition (e.g., 10 to 8) within a Petri net refers to the change in
decimal value, from ten to eight, within the PLC’s input module.
The assumptions, and limitation, do not alter the applicability of this research or
the significance of its findings. Utilizing known programs as a basis for differentiating
input-output behavior is necessary and sufficient for this research. Bonet compared PIPE
to several other Petri net tools and preferred PIPE’s interface and analysis modules
(Bonet, 2007). The key analysis modules used are:
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GSPN analysis – Checks for safeness and boundedness, and generates a
tangible state table



Reachability graph – Checks for safeness and boundedness, and generates a
graph of all possible firing sequences between reachable states



Simulation – Performs step-wise and fully automated simulation for a Petri
net

Additionally, the Petri net modeling interface analysis fully captures the defined
process requirements for each PLC instance. The appropriate enabling states for each
transition are representative of the proposed PLC programs.
1.5

Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 provides an introduction for this research. This includes the motivation

for this research, research statement, research approach, assumptions, and the
organization for this document.
Chapter 2 presents fundamental concepts and related work associated with this
research. Background topics include SCADA, resilience, and Petri nets. Related work
includes efforts related to SCADA security and resilience.
Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology. First, a definition of the
system boundaries is provided. Second, the factors and workload applied to the system
are defined. Finally, details for characterizing the PLC instances into Petri nets and the
method for performance evaluation are presented.
Chapter 4 provides the details for the results and analysis of the PLC instances. A
corollary analysis of the resulting metrics is performed to identify statistically relevant
observations.

Then significant findings from the analysis of the metrics and their

applicability toward resilience are discussed.
6

Chapter 5 reviews the key points of this research and provides recommendations
for follow-on research. Finally, concluding remarks for this research are provided.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter addresses fundamental concepts and related work.

Section 2.1

details background topics in SCADA, resilience and Petri nets. Section 2.2 discusses
several works closely related to SCADA security and resilience.
2.1

Background
The background topics relevant to this research include SCADA, resilience, and

Petri nets. An overview of SCADA architecture is presented along with discussion on
security vulnerabilities of associated subcomponents. Additionally, the definition of
resilience is discussed, and Petri nets are discussed as a practical means of modeling
processes.

2.1.1

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

SCADA systems provide an efficient means of monitoring and controlling
processes across large geographical regions. SCADA systems are implemented in most
modern industrial facilities, such as utilities and manufacturing. Approximately 90
percent of the nation’s critical infrastructures are privately owned; a majority of these
implementing SCADA as part of their enterprise network (Stouffer, 2008). Indeed,
SCADA systems allow industries to streamline operating processes that cover vast
geographical regions.

To further enhance operating efficiency, industries have now

integrated the SCADA system with their business enterprise networks (Stouffer, 2008).
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2.1.1.1 Components of SCADA
A SCADA system consists of a control center, communication links, and field
sites (Figure 1) (Stouffer, 2008). The control center is comprised of the following:


Human Machine Interface – displays status of field sites in graphical form.



Engineering Workstations – allows for operator control of field sites.



Data Historian – storage and analysis of processed data.



Control Server or Master Terminal Unit (MTU) – operates SCADA functions,
and processes data between control center and field sites.

Figure 1: SCADA Components (Stouffer, 2008)

Communication links, routers, and modems relay and convert signals for
processing between field sites and the control center. Field sites consist of end-devices
that collect data from various sensors (e.g., pressure, flow, or temperature) and transmit
the appropriate data to the MTU. The end devices represented in Figure 1 include
programmable logic controllers (PLC), intelligent electronic devices (IED), and remote
9

terminal units (RTU) (Stouffer, 2008). These devices perform similar functions in that
they locally control devices (e.g., motors, sensors, valves) and are able to communicate
with the control center.
While PLCs and RTUs share similarities, they differ by their interaction to enddevices. RTUs may communicate with other processing units prior to control of an enddevice, while PLCs are directly linked to end-devices. PLCs are also more capable of
tightly controlling sequential physical processes. The PLC replaces what traditionally
were multiple solid state relays, switches, and mechanical timers; however, PLC’s
flexible programming facilitates configuration changes to physical process requirements.

2.1.1.2 SCADA Security Issues
SCADA systems are designed to provide cost effective control and data
acquisition. Security was not initially a priority of SCADA design and development.
However, in the past decade focus on SCADA security has grown due to both intentional
(Table 1) and unintentional events (Table 2) (Stouffer, 2008) (Falliere, 2011). Nonintentional events have traditionally been addressed with redundant and fault tolerant
architectures. Only recently has intentional consequences of malicious events drawn the
attention of security experts in the SCADA domain.
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Table 1: Intentional SCADA Incidents
Name

Worcester Air
Traffic
Communications

Description
In March 1997, a teenager in Worcester, Massachusetts disabled part of the public switched
telephone network using a dial-up modem connected to the system. This knocked out phone
service at the control tower, airport security, the airport fire department, the weather service,
and carriers that use the airport. Also, the tower’s main radio transmitter and another
transmitter that activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer that controllers use
to monitor flight progress. The attack also knocked out phone service to 600 homes and
businesses in the nearby town of Rutland (Thomas, 1998).

In the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian organization that develops
manufacturing software applied for a job with the local government, but was rejected. Over a
two-month period, the disgruntled rejected employee reportedly used a radio transmitter on as
MAROOCHY
many as 46 occasions to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment system. He
Shire Sewage Spill
altered electronic data for particular sewerage pumping stations and caused malfunctions in their
operations, ultimately releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and
parks (Smith, 2001).

Stuxnet Siemens
Worm

Stuxnet is a threat targeting a specific industrial control system likely in Iran, such as a gas
pipeline or power plant. The ultimate goal of Stuxnet is to sabotage that facility by
reprogramming PLCs to operate as the attackers intend them to, most likely out of their
specified boundaries. Stuxnet was discovered in July 2010, but is confirmed to have existed at
least one year prior and likely even before. The majority of infections were found in Iran
(Falliere, 2011).

The introduction of business enterprise networks to the SCADA domain has
increased vulnerability to malicious attack. Injection points of attack can occur via the
Internet, the enterprise network, internal workstations, or communication links between
the control center and field sites (Stouffer, 2008). The end goal of a SCADA specific
attack may include affecting the physical process by altering the end devices (e.g.,
motors, sensors, valves); such was the case with the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet executed
code on specific PLCs that caused physical damage to specific drive motors (Falliere,
2011). Stuxnet was not detected by SCADA operators due to a rootkit that masked the
deviant behavior.
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Table 2: Non-Intentional SCADA Incidents
Name

Description

CSX Train
Signaling System

In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems
throughout the east coast of the U.S. The virus infected the computer system at CSX Corp.’s
Jacksonville, Florida headquarters, shutting down signaling, dispatching, and other systems.
According to Amtrak spokesman Dan Stessel, ten Amtrak trains were affected in the morning.
Trains between Pittsburgh and Florence, South Carolina were halted because of dark signals,
and one regional Amtrak train from Richmond, Virginia to Washington and New York was
delayed for more than two hours. Long-distance trains were also delayed between four and six
hours (Niland, 2003).

Davis-Besse

In August 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in January 2003, the
Microsoft SQL Server worm known as Slammer infected a private computer network at the
idled Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring
system for nearly five hours. In addition, the plant’s process computer failed, and it took about
six hours for it to become available again. Slammer reportedly also affected communications on
the control networks of at least five other utilities by propagating so quickly that control system
traffic was blocked (Poulsen, 2003).

Northeast Power
Blackout

In August 2003, failure of the alarm processor in First Energy’s SCADA system prevented
control room operators from having adequate situational awareness of critical operational
changes to the electrical grid. Additionally, effective reliability oversight was prevented when the
state estimator at the Midwest Independent System Operator failed due to incomplete
information on topology changes, preventing contingency analysis. Several key 345kV
transmission lines in Northern Ohio trip due to contact with trees. This eventually initiates
cascading overloads of additional 345 kV and 138 kV lines, leading to an uncontrolled
cascading failure of the grid. A total of 61,800 MW load was lost as 508 generating units at
265 power plants tripped (Minkel, 2008).

Zotob Worm

In August 2005, a round of Internet worm infections knocked 13 of DaimlerChrysler’s U.S.
automobile manufacturing plants offline for almost an hour; stranding workers as infected
Microsoft Windows systems were patched. Plants in Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio,
Delaware, and Michigan were knocked offline. While the worm affected primarily Windows
2000 systems, it also affected some early versions of Windows XP. Symptoms include the
repeated shutdown and rebooting of a computer. Zotob and its variations caused computer
outages at heavy-equipment maker Caterpillar Inc., aircraft-maker Boeing, and several large
U.S. news organizations (Roberts, 2005).
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2.1.2

Resilience Overview

In general terms, resilience is the ability of a system to continue to operate
through disruptions.

This notion encompasses a multitude of other terms such as

robustness, dependability, and survivability. These characteristics are important to the
protection and healing of a system. This section surveys various resilience models from
other domains for applicability to SCADA systems (e.g., PLCs).

2.1.2.1 Defining Resilience
Resilience has been researched in other domains in which biological,
psychological and community resilient models have been formulated.

Biological

resilience presents itself in the study of immune systems (VanBreda, 2001).
Psychological resilience has been studied in the mental capacity for individuals to
perform through adversity (VanBreda, 2001). Community and organizational resilience
is demonstrated through the ability of a group or region to recover from catastrophic
events (Tierney, 2007; Cutter, 2008). In each of these domains, a common structure of
resilience is presented. For example, the components of psychological resilience can be
categorized into the following three parts (VanBreda, 2001):


Inner Self Mechanism - monitoring your physical, meditative, and mental
awareness



Relationship Mechanism - monitoring the taking and giving awareness as well
as your self-relationship



Method - monitoring your habits
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This structure of resilience incorporate self awareness and self monitoring
mechanisms from the psychological domain in order to initiate the actions required to
maintain functional capacity and ability to recover.
Similarly, Tierney (2007) presents resilience in a community or organization as:


Robustness - the ability of systems, system elements, and other units of
analysis to withstand disaster forces without significant degradation or loss of
performance



Redundancy - the extent to which systems, system elements, or other units are
substitutable, that is, capable of satisfying functional requirements, if
significant degradation or loss of functionality occurs



Resourcefulness - the ability to diagnose and prioritize problems and to
initiate solutions by identifying and mobilizing material, monetary,
informational, technological, and human resources



Rapidity - the capacity to restore functionality in a timely way, containing
losses and avoiding disruptions

Trivedi (2009) states that while qualitative descriptions of resilience across
domains have been accomplished, applicable quantitative measures are still deficient.
This statement is particularly applicable to computer systems. His work attempts to
quantify metrics that compare availability, performance, and survivability for computer
systems (Trivedi, 2009).

Similarly, quantifying resilience of SCADA systems is

necessary to measure their ability to perform when perturbations or disruptions to the
system occur.
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2.1.2.2 Resilience Framework
While there are numerous definitions of resilience across various domains, The
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) provides perhaps the most fitting
definition with respect to SCADA. NIAC (2009) define infrastructure resilience as:
“the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The
effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to
anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive
event.” (p. 8)
This definition provides a framework for resilience according to the following
four characteristics:
1. The ability to anticipate a potentially disruptive event requires that the
system has a self awareness of its baseline and is able to monitor its
current state.
2. The ability to absorb potentially disruptive events requires that the system
has mechanisms in place to minimize the amount, if any, of performance
loss.
3. The ability to adapt requires that the system have contingencies available
that allow for flexible system adjustments to maintain operational
availability.
4. The ability to recover from a disruptive event requires mechanisms (either
automated or manual processes) which allow the system to perform up to
its baseline.

2.1.3

Petri Nets Overview

Petri nets are named after its creator Carl A. Petri in 1962 (Zurawski, 1994).
Initial development in 1962 concentrated on the study of communication via automata.
Zurawski and Zhou provide a simple definition (Zurawski, 1994):
“Petri nets as, graphical and mathematical tools, provide a uniform environment
for modeling, formal analysis, and design of discrete event systems.” (p. 567)
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In its graphical form, Petri nets consist of four basic parts: (i) places, (ii)
transitions, (iii) arcs, and (iv) tokens. The places and transitions are indicative of nodes
within a graph and arcs relate to pairs of places and transitions. The tokens represent
places which are active (marked). Table 3 lists examples of places and transitions.

Table 3: Examples of Petri Net Places and Transitions (Abhishek, 2005)

Places
pre/post condition
input/output data
input/output signal
resources
buffer

Transitions

event
computational step
signal processor
tasking
processor

2.1.3.1 Simple Petri Net Example
Figure 2 illustrates three markings of a Petri net modeling a simple traffic light,
with one light for red, yellow, and green (Abhishek, 2005). Places are represented by
circles, transitions as blocks (or bars), arcs as directed arrows, and tokens as dots. The
initial marked graph (M0) shows that a token is active in the red place, which is
interpreted as the red light being active (or illuminated). Note that there is only one token
in the red place of the initial marked graph (M0) to emphasize that only one red light
exists for this example. The presence of multiple tokens in one place may be interpreted
as the existence of more than one red light in the system.
The basic rules for transitioning a Petri net from one marked graph (M0) to the
next (M1) involves the action of the transitions (Peterson, 1977). The execution of a
transition is called firing. In order for a transition to fire, the transition must be enabled.
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A transition is enabled, and may fire, if all its input places contain at least one token.
Note that even though a transition is enabled, it is not strictly required to fire. The firing
of a transition results in moving a token from the input places to all output places. In the
traffic light example, all transitions have only one input and output place, so it is easily
shown that the number of tokens in the Petri net remain unchanged (at one). Figure 2
shows all possible states of the Petri net (based on the initial state of M0 with one token).
The sequence of places is limited to one light (red, green, or yellow) illuminated in any
specific instance, and limited to one repeating sequence (R  G  Y).

Figure 2: Example Traffic Light Petri Net

2.1.3.2 Formal Definition of a Petri Net
A Petri net C consists of four subsets, C = {P, T, I, O}, such that P is a set of
places, T is a set of transitions, I is a set of input functions for each transition, and O is a
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set of output functions for each transition (Peterson , 1981). The formal definition for the
traffic light example in Figure 2 is represented as:


C = {P, T, I, O}



P = {red, green, yellow}



T = {T0, T1, T2}



I(T0) = {red}, I(T1) = {green}, I(T2) = {yellow}



O(T0) = {green}, O(T1) = {yellow}, O(T2} = {red}

2.1.3.3 Petri nets in Application
Petri nets have been applied to modeling of performance, reliability, fault
recovery, and fault tolerance in various systems such as operating systems, queues, traffic
control and mathematics (Peterson, 1981). Additionally, modeling of manufacturing
processes similar to SCADA applications have also been analyzed (Zurawski, 1994).
However, the analysis of these systems focuses primarily on fault tolerance and reliability
within the systems’ designs.

Utilizing Petri nets to analyze systems for intentional

exploits (e.g., malware) is significant to increasing the security posture of SCADA
systems.
Properties of Petri nets that are practical for analysis of SCADA applications are
concurrency, safeness and boundedness (Peterson, 1977). Concurrency allows for the
modeling of parallel processes that occur between the multiple devices that interact in a
SCADA system.

Safeness and boundedness addresses the potential issue of state

explosion when analyzing a system. Safeness implies no more than one token may be
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present in each place of a Petri net. It follows that if a Petri net is safe, then it is also
bounded. This results in a finite set of reachable markings since tokens are not created
without bound. These properties well suit the defined configuration and deterministic
interdependencies present in SCADA systems. Properly defining places and transitions
for a Petri net based on SCADA system processes should result in a finite set of states.
2.2

Related Work
The related works section examines analysis and resiliency concepts relating to

SCADA security. Queiroz (2010) and Germanus (2010) present individual models for
SCADA security analysis at a macro-level, while Shah (2008) explores SCADA security
protocol at a micro-level. Wei (2009) provides an exploratory analysis of resilience
metrics that may be utilized to assess industrial control systems.

2.2.1

Survivable SCADA Systems

Queiroz (2010) presents a model to quantify SCADA system performance against
a denial of service (DoS) attack. The model focuses on the interplay of four main
components of a SCADA system: RTU, MTU, HMI Server, and Data Historian. The
availability of each component is modeled as queues that allow each service to handle a
specific number of requests. The aggregate output of each component’s availability is
compiled into a Bayesian table, which incorporates the interdependencies, and then
quantifies the survivability of the SCADA system. Figure 3 provides a summary for two
sets of sample data. The thresholds for each of the SCADA components (i.e., normal,
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degraded, unavailable) and survivability (i.e., yes, no) for the system is pre-determined
prior to model analysis.

Figure 3: Queiroz’s Summary for Sample Data (Queiroz, 2010)

Quieroz’s research contributes to part two of the previously defined resilience
framework (i.e., the ability to absorb potentially disruptive events requires that the system
has mechanisms in place to minimize the amount, if any, of performance loss).
Interdependencies of a particular SCADA system may be analyzed to determine if the
architecture is survivable against a DoS attack. The result of the analysis can be used to
improve the absorptive capacity for the SCADA system. Quieroz’s approach is sufficient
for system wide analysis of a SCADA system and the timing interdependencies between
network nodes. However, it does not account for hardware or software faults. They
assume that each node itself is not prone to failure; only that the communication between
the nodes is interrupted which causes degradation of node availability, and subsequently
system survivability.
The Quieroz (2010) approach ignores traditional fault tolerance or the presence of
malware. Hardware faults are traditionally classified in the domain of fault tolerance,
while software faults may include malware exploits such as Stuxnet.
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Additionally,

Quieroz’s contribution towards resilience resides at the macro level of the SCADA
system. No observations are made to determine the specific behavior of one particular
node. This approach does not address part one of the resilience framework (i.e., the
ability to anticipate a potentially disruptive event requires that the system has a self
awareness of its baseline and is able monitor its current state) and lacks the sensitivity to
detect malware. While the model works well in determining susceptibility to DoS attacks
and improving a SCADA system’s absorptive capacity, it is insufficient in monitoring the
current state of the SCADA system to aid real-time monitoring of system behavior at a
micro-level (e.g., end-device control via PLC).

2.2.2

Redundant SCADA Network Architecture

Germanus (2010) presents a model in which communication between the RTU
and MTU is performed via redundant links throughout the SCADA system. The model
implements the redundant paths as middleware that are assumed to be free from security
vulnerabilities. This model may improve the SCADA system’s resilience against DoS
and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. DoS attacks may be mitigated by using the
redundant paths available on the network links. MITM attacks may be mitigated by the
data integrity checks associated with the middleware. Figure 4 illustrates the middleware
model that passively extracts SCADA communication and relays it across the peer-topeer (P2P) overlay.
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Figure 4: Germanus’ Middleware Building Blocks (Germanus, 2010)

The advantages to this model are flexibility, interoperability, and minimal
intrusiveness.

The flexibility allows the system to withstand link failures which

addresses part two of the resilience framework (i.e., the ability to absorb potentially
disruptive events requires that the system has mechanisms in place to minimize the
amount, if any, of performance loss). Figure 5 illustrates the interoperability and minimal
intrusiveness of Germanus’ model which facilitates deployment of the model to existing
SCADA systems since the P2P overlay uses middleware as an interface between existing
RTU and MTU links (Germanus, 2010).
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Figure 5: Germanus’ (2010) Redundant P2P Model

The model expands on Quieroz’s research contribution to SCADA resilience in
two ways.

First, it can be implemented real-time on existing SCADA system

infrastructure. Second, the redundant network paths provide increased node availability,
and therefore increase survivability of the SCADA system.
Similar to Quieroz’s research, Germanus’ analysis resides at the macro-level of
the SCADA system. Detection of hardware and software faults local to either the RTU or
MTU is undetected since it is isolated to the SCADA system’s communication links.
Local behavior of any particular RTU is still only monitored through the HMI. However,
the P2P overlay is able to provide real-time feedback of link or message abnormalities
and partially addresses part one of the resilience framework since it will detect systemic
behavior.
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2.2.3

Mechanisms to Provide Integrity in SCADA Devices

Shah (2008) presents a method to verify the executable code of a PLC. The
method implements a challenge-response protocol between the PLC and an external
dispatcher. A verification function resides on both the PLC and dispatcher. Figure 6
summarizes the steps of the verification protocol. Steps one through three assures that
the verification function is trustworthy, while steps four and five assure that the
executable code of the PLC is untampered (Shah, 2008). Steps one through five of
Shah’s challenge-response protocol is as follows:
1. The dispatcher sends a random challenge to the PLC.
2. The verification function of the PLC computes a checksum.
3. PLC returns the results to the dispatcher.
4. Verification function of the PLC creates a hash of the executable code.
5. PLC sends the hash result to the dispatcher which compares it against the
known hash.

Figure 6: Shah’s (2008) Verification Function Overview
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This method of verifying executable code on the PLC approaches SCADA
resilience from the local node level as opposed to the system-level approaches of Quieroz
and Germanus. Shah’s method addresses the first part of the resilience framework (i.e.,
the ability to anticipate a potentially disruptive event requires that the system has a self
awareness of its baseline and is able monitor its current state) since it is able to detect
changes to the executable code on the PLC. It also provides flexibility since it may be
implemented in existing PLCs currently deployed in the field; however, it requires that
the verification function be integrated with the PLC.
Shah’s method incurs several logistical issues. The paper acknowledges that the
verification functions of the PLC and dispatcher are different for each PLC manufacturer
(Shah, 2008). While the challenge-response protocol is general across platforms, the
verification functions differ based on the PLC architecture. Another logistical issue is
that the PLC must be taken off-line to perform the challenge-response protocol between
the dispatcher and PLC. This presents operational impacts to most SCADA systems
since most PLCs run real-time applications.
Shah (2008) also acknowledges that the verification process only assures that no
malicious code is present at the time the verification function is performed between the
dispatcher and PLC. It does not prevent timed attacks in which the adversary may
execute malicious code on the PLC between verification timelines. Additionally, the
method does not address the second part of the resilience framework (i.e., the ability to
absorb potentially disruptive events requires that the system has mechanisms in place to
minimize the amount, if any, of performance loss) since no processes are in place to
reduce the effect of malicious code once detected.
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2.2.4

Resilient ICS: Concepts, Formulation, Metrics, and Insights

Industrial control systems (ICS) are deployed in sectors such as agriculture,
utilities, and transportation. Wei (2009) presents a set of resilience metrics that may be
used to quantify performance of a system. Figure 7 identifies the trigger points for a
resilient system across a timeline. The trigger points are utilized to define equations for
protection time, degradation time, identification time, recovery time, performance
degradation, performance loss, total loss, and overall potential critical loss.

Figure 7: Wei’s Resilience Curve (Wei, 2009)
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Subsets of the defined equations that apply to the first and second parts of the
resilience framework are (Wei, 2009):


Protection time – time that the system tolerates an incident without
degradation



Degradation time – time that the system incurs to reach its minimum
performance level



Identification time – time from incident occurrence to system identification



Performance degradation – difference between baseline performance and
degraded performance due to incident

The four definitions presented by Wei address the detection of the incident and
the level of mitigation the system performs. These definitions, or slight variations of
them, may aid in analyzing various models that seek to improve resilience in SCADA
systems.
2.3

Summary of Literature
This chapter presented the relevant background and related works associated with

quantifying resiliency of PLCs through the use of Petri nets. Knowledge of SCADA
architecture and security vulnerabilities is a foundational element. A formal definition of
resilience and Petri nets is also relevant to key areas of Chapters 3 and 4 of this research.
The various SCADA security analysis techniques presented at both the macro and microlevels provide a basis of comparison for the proposed methodology of Chapter 3. The
related work on resilient metrics for ICS is insightful to the hypothesis of this research
and gives relevance to findings in Chapter 4.
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III. Methodology
This chapter presents the methodology for characterizing the PLC ladder logic
programs into equivalent Petri nets for evaluating metrics to assess resilience. Section
3.1 describes the goal and hypothesis for this research. Section 3.2 identifies the system
boundaries. Section 3.3 describes the system services. Section 3.4 lists the parameters of
the system.

Section 3.5 defines the factors that apply to the system.

Section 3.6

describes the workload applied to the system. Section 3.7 details the approach for
characterizing the ladder logic into equivalent Petri nets. Section 3.8 identifies the
performance metrics derived from the experimentation.
evaluation method used to form resilience metrics.

Section 3.9 describes the
Section 3.10 outlines the

experimental design.
3.1

Problem Definition
Improving the resilience of ICS allows critical infrastructures to withstand

degrading events, and recover to a nominal functional capability within an acceptable
period.

However, determining resilience requires that a system’s susceptibility to

degradation and capability to recover is quantifiable. Narrowing the scope of research to
a micro-level component of a SCADA system provides a basis to facilitate evaluation of
potential resilience metrics.

3.1.1

Goal

The primary goal of this research is to identify metrics that may assess a PLCs
performance with respect to the resilience framework presented in Chapter 2.
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A

complimentary goal is to identify metrics that are applicable to real-time physical
mechanisms. The resilience curve (Figure 7) identifies trigger points that are utilized in
evaluating resilience performance; however, the mechanisms for the triggers are absent.
Achieving both research goals may result in applicable mechanisms which appropriately
assess resilience in controlled (e.g., benchmark) and real-time (e.g., operations)
environments. This research may reveal comparative metrics that help determine if
awareness of the system state is discernible.

Self-awareness is a foundational

characteristic of the resilient framework and provides a basis for tangible mechanisms to
implement trigger points in real-time hardware protection schemes.

3.1.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research is that a PLC’s ability to identify and absorb
malicious alterations is quantifiable by monitoring system outputs in response to system
inputs. The approach to derive the metrics for resilience assessment uses comparative
analysis of various instances of PLC programs.

3.2

System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT) is the PLC processes. Figure 8 illustrates the SUT

and associated inputs and outputs. The workload applied to the SUT includes various
attack instances as detailed in Section 3.6. The parameters applied to the SUT are
primarily fixed attributes of the PLC emulation provided by LogixPro® 500; the varying
parameter during experimentation is the protection scheme applied to each specific PLC
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instance. The metric produced from the SUT is the decimal input and output values
produced during program execution.

Figure 8: PLC SUT Diagram

System components that comprise the PLC include: Memory, Data/Code, CPU,
Input Ports, Output Ports, Power Supply, and Communication Port. The component
under test (CUT) is the data/code or programming logic of the system. Data/code is
programmed in ladder logic from a laptop with the accompanying LogixPro®

500

software package associated with the PLC. The program is loaded to the PLC which
executes the ladder logic and produces observable output signals in response to input
signals.
3.3

System Services
A PLC provides four primary services: (i) execution of the ladder logic program,

(ii) monitoring of input signals, (iii) production of output signals, and (iv) providing data
back to the master device of a SCADA system. It is assumed that accurate data are
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transmitted to the master device (i.e., no spoofing of output states), and that input signals
are only injected at valid input ports (i.e., no spoofing of input states). It is also assumed
that the programs (i.e., baseline and enumerated versions) are not subject to hardware
faults or undesired software faults. These assumptions isolate the boundary of the system
from external influences, and assure the integrity of the applied inputs and observed
outputs.
The primary services monitored are the applied inputs and the behavior of the
outputs. The observed PLC output signals are a direct result of the PLC program code
execution and the input signal status. Applying inputs to the PLC produces output signal
states that affect the end-devices (e.g., motors, lights, actuators).

These behavioral

responses of the output states in response to the input states are measurable in the
observed status of the end-devices. The PLC’s interaction with the end-devices fall into
one of three observable response categories:


Valid – Nominal input results in nominal output processes



Degraded – Nominal input results in deviant but safe output processes. A safe
outcome is defined as a non-nominal output response in which the system’s
interactions with end-devices do not cause catastrophic losses (e.g., minor
perturbations)



Unstable – Nominal input results in deviant and unsafe processes. An unsafe
outcome is defined as a non-nominal output response in which the system’s
interactions with end-devices may cause catastrophic losses (e.g., loss of life
or resources)

Table 4 outlines system responses using a traffic signal example.

For this

example, the input is an automated timed sequence which transitions the light between its
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potential outputs. In nominal conditions the sequence is always valid (see Table 4).
However, as seen in Table 4, in non-nominal conditions the sequences are degraded
(within defined process requirements) or unstable (outside defined process requirements).
The output of the end-devices (i.e., lights) are observed, and categorized accordingly.

Table 4: Example Traffic Light System Response

Category
Valid
Degraded
Unstable

3.4

Traffic Signal Output
Lights transition from green to yellow to red.
Lights transition from green to yellow to flashing red.
Lights transition from green to yellow to green.

System Parameters
The following are the system parameters: Power Input, Communication Port

Input, Communication Port Output, CPU scanning speed, Memory size, Input module
size, Output module size, Data/Code (programmed Ladder Logic). Table 5 describes
each parameter.
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Table 5: Parameters

Parameter

Description

Power Input

Provides power to the PLC via an AC to DC inverter. This remains at factory
default (24VDC).

Provides access to write to PLC memory. This is used to download program
Communication Input
code to the PLC via serial communications using RS-232 signaling. During
Port
testing, the port is not used and is in a closed state.
Communication
Output Port

Provides external and remote monitoring of the PLC via an external master
unit. During testing, the port is not used and is in a closed state.

CPU Scanning
Speed

Adjusts the rate at which the code is read from memory. The experiment will
use factory default settings of 44 Kbps.

Memory size is upgradeable depending on the size of programming required.
The experiment does not necessitate programs larger than the factory default
memory space. The experiment will use the factory default of 1K.
Modules are upgradeable depending on the number of required inputs signals
Input Module Size
that are required to connect to the PLC. The experiment does not necessitate
a number larger than the factory default input module size (4 input channels).
Modules are upgradeable depending on number of required outputs signals that
Output Module Size are required to connect to the PLC. The testing scenarios do not necessitate a
number larger than the factory default output module size (4 output channels).
Ladder logic is the data held in memory which is executed by the CPU. Input
Data/Code (Ladder
channels are scanned, depending on the program logic, and output channels are
Logic)
energized.
Memory Size

3.5

Factors
The factor of interest resides in the ladder logic programs of the PLC. Two

variations of a program baseline are applied to the CUT. The research environment
consists of a process emulation using LogixPro® 500.

LogixPro® 500 provides a

graphical user interface to develop, compile, and execute distinct instances of PLC
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programs and system operating parameters. The multiple instances demonstrate distinct
observable input-output behavioral patterns when subjected to various example malicious
attacks. For each instance, two baseline program categories are established:

3.6



Baseline – A program to perform defined process requirements; generates
valid input-output responses.



Delta Baseline – A protection scheme applied to the baseline that generates
valid input-output responses. The protection scheme can be considered
equivalent to a fail-safe system state (e.g., flashing red lights for a roadway
stoplight system).

Workload
The workload includes ten instances of PLC attacks applied to the CUT. These

ten instances were created such that degraded physical operations of the system are
readily observable.

Table 6 summarizes the ten attack instances.

The attacks, in

combination with the baseline program categories, form two additional program
categories:


Attack Baseline – A targeted attack to the baseline that generates degraded or
unstable input-output responses.



Attack Delta Baseline – A targeted attack applied to the delta baseline that
generates valid, degraded or unstable input-output responses.
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Table 6: Ten PLC Attack Instances

Instance
1
2
3

remove logic for manual stop in rung 0; plant runs continuously

4

remove logic for full signal in rung 3; slowly floods plant due to lag
response of fill valve to close; may stop manually

5

combine attack 2 & 4; quickly floods plant; may stop manually

6

combine attacks 2, 3, and 4; quickly floods plant; manual stop disabled

7

remove logic for proximity sensor and full light signal in rung 1; slowly
floods due to containers not stopping at fill station; may stop manually

8

combine attack 6 & 7; quickly floods plant; manual stop disabled

9
10

3.7

Description
remove logic for proximity sensor in rung 3; quickly floods plant unless
stopped manually
remove ladder logic for level sensor in rung 2; quickly floods plant unless
stopped manually

remove full light and motor signal in rung 4; slowly floods plant; may stop
manually
remove logic for proximity sensor and motor signal in rung 4; quickly
floods; may stop manually

Approach
This section describes the methodology for characterizing the input-output

relationships for a PLC’s programming logic. An initial baseline program is established
that incorporates PLC programming for an operational system. Once the baseline is
established, modifications are made to emulate a PLC infected with malware. Protective
schemes are then applied to mitigate effects of the malware. The enumerated instances of
the PLC programs are evaluated to observe deviations of input-output behavior. Petri net
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models are then utilized to extract metrics that measure the PLC’s security performance
with respect to the resiliency framework.
The various PLC instances establish a basis of observable input-output responses
that are modeled and analyzed using Petri nets. The observations obtained from the inputoutput responses are consistent with black-box analysis; however, application of the
targeted attacks and protection schemes use the PLC program to facilitate differentiation
of observed behavior from the defined nominal process requirements. The following
steps describe the methodology for deriving each of the four program categories and
equivalent Petri nets.
1. Establish Baseline Program – A ladder logic program is developed to
perform defined nominal process requirements. The baseline program
generates valid system input-output responses.
2. The possible combinations for outputs of the formal ladder logic are
abstracted as places in a Petri net.
3. The possible combinations for inputs of the formal ladder logic are
abstracted as transitions in a Petri net.
4. The input and output interdependencies of the formal ladder logic are
abstracted as input and output functions for each of the potential
transitions of the Petri net.
5. The data obtained in steps 2 through 4 are combined to define a Petri net
for stochastic analysis of the input-output behavior.
6. Establish Delta Baseline Program – The original ladder logic developed
in Step 1 is modified to incorporate a protective scheme that generates
valid input-output responses. Steps 2 through 5 are repeated to produce the
equivalent Petri net of the delta baseline PLC Program.
7. Establish Attack Baseline Program – This step modifies the ladder logic in
a manner consistent with a targeted malicious attack. Steps 2 through 5 are
repeated to produce the equivalent Petri net of the attack baseline PLC
Program.
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8. Establish Attack Delta Baseline Program – The ladder logic developed in
Step 7 is modified with a targeted attack to generate degraded or unstable
input-output responses. Steps 2 through 5 are repeated to produce the
equivalent Petri net of the attack delta baseline PLC Program.

This research examines ten instances and varying attacks using an example silo
process for experimentation.

Each PLC instance has a baseline and delta baseline

program; each instance also has an attack applied to each baseline. The net result is each
PLC instance has four generated programs and corresponding Petri nets. The following
provides a step-by-step guide to generate the four programs and corresponding Petri nets
for the first PLC instance. The remaining nine instances are derived in a similar fashion;
the resulting programs and Petri nets are provided in Appendix A.

3.7.1

Establish Baseline for PLC Instance #1

This phase constructs a ladder logic program which executes a defined set of
process requirements. Consider, for example, a system process in a silo plant that fills
containers via a conveyer belt and automated sensors. The nominal processes for the silo
plant are: bring an empty container into the plant, maneuver the container under the silo
valve, fill the container until full, and ship the full container out of the plant. Figure 9
shows a baseline ladder logic program for the process.
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Figure 9: Ladder Logic of Baseline Program

3.7.2

Characterize Baseline Program as Petri Net

This phase translates the ladder logic program into an equivalent Petri net.
Potential inputs, outputs, and interdependencies of the program are converted into a Petri
net C = {P, T, I, O}. The formal definition of C is used to generate a graphical Petri net
that is simulated to derive analytical data and metrics.
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3.7.2.1 List Potential Output Behavior
Output behavior of the program is monitored and recorded during its execution.
For this example, output behavior during simulation is described as the following: deliver
container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full, depart silo, stop depart, ship
container, stop ship. Note that observed output behavior of the program closely mirrors
the nominal process requirements described in Section 3.7.1; the only additions are the
stop intervals during any portion of the program’s execution. This is as expected since a
PLC directly controls physical devices.
The output behaviors form the set of output places, P, for the Petri net C: P =
{deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full, depart silo, stop
depart, ship container, stop ship}. Note that a place (e.g., deliver container) within a
Petri net is defined as an observed physical process of the PLC.

3.7.2.2 List Potential Input Transitions
Input transitions of the program that result in changes to output behavior are
monitored and recorded. For example, consider the following input transitions: 2 to 0, 2
to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to 24, 26 to 27. These input
transitions form the set of transitions for the Petri net: T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2,
10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to 24, 26 to 27}. Note that a transition (e.g., 2 to
0) within a Petri net is defined as a change in decimal value from two to zero, within the
PLC’s input module.
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3.7.2.3 Identify Input-Output Interdependencies
The input and output interdependencies of the program during execution are
monitored and recorded. This step defines the arcs that interconnect the places and
transitions of the Petri net. The process of defining each of the Petri nets focuses strictly
on PLC program input transitions that cause a physical output state to change. For
example in the baseline program, the act of the user releasing the stop button causes the
input value to transition from 0 to 2; however it causes no change to the output state.
Only the act of pressing the stop button (changing input value from 2 to 0) may cause a
change to the output state. This simplification to the Petri net models enables PIPEv4.0
to adequately model the input-output behavior of the PLC programs. Note that the output
places are annotated with the cumulative decimal value of the PLC’s output module for a
given observable physical process (i.e., deliver container is manifested when the decimal
value of the PLC is 5). The set of I consist of the following functions:


I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {ship container (21)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}
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The set of O consist of the following functions:


O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {ship container (21)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}

3.7.2.4 Formal Petri Net of Program
The formal Petri net for the baseline program is defined as C = {P, T, I, O}.
Combining the definitions for P, T, I and O from Section 3.7.2.1 through Section 3.7.2.3
results in the graphical Petri net presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Petri Net of Baseline Program

3.7.3

Establish Delta Baseline Program

Establishing a delta baseline program provides a ladder logic program which
emulates the process requirements of the baseline program. The primary difference is
that it provides robustness against a targeted attack (Table 6). The formation of the
baseline and delta baseline program comprises the two possible factors for each PLC
instance. Characterization of the delta baseline program into a Petri net follows the
method described in Section 3.7.2. The resulting ladder logic and Petri net for the delta
baseline program is provided in Appendix A.

3.7.4 Apply Workload (Attacks to Baselines)
The applications of attacks to the baseline and delta baseline programs comprise
the workload for the experimentation. The attacks modify the ladder logic of each of the
baseline program. The resulting attacks result in two additional PLC programs: attack
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baseline, and attack delta baseline. Characterization of these two programs via a Petri
net follows the method described in Section 3.7.2. The resulting programs and Petri nets
for the attack baseline, and attack delta baseline, are provided in Appendix A.
In all PLC instances the attack baseline programs demonstrate degraded or
unstable output; similarly, all attack delta baseline programs demonstrate stable or
degraded output. This outcome is a product of the assumption that states all attacks are
based on internal knowledge of the baseline program. This also highlights the fact that
the delta baseline programs are consequently more robust than the baseline programs
when similar attacks are applied.
3.8

Performance Metrics
The metric of interest produced from the SUT are the decimal values of the input

and output states during the execution of the programs for each PLC instance. The
decimal values of the input and output states are measured directly from the input and
output modules of the PLC.

Observing the input-output behavior during program

execution allows for the characterization of an equivalent Petri net. The Petri nets are
then analyzed to derive comparative metrics to determine which set(s) of programs
provide significant findings towards assessing a PLC’s performance with respect to the
resilience framework.
Performing a pair-wise comparison between the four possible programs results in
six possible pairings:


(baseline – delta baseline)



(baseline – attack baseline)
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(baseline – attack delta baseline)



(attack baseline – delta baseline)



(attack baseline – attack delta baseline)



(delta baseline – attack delta baseline)

Analyzing the observed differences between these pairings provides metrics for
assessing PLC performance with respect to the resiliency framework.

The direct

measurements and comparisons of the input and output states of the PLC provide a true
representation of the PLCs performance.
3.9

Evaluation Technique
The experiments are performed via two methods: (i) direct measurement on PLC

hardware, and (ii) simulated results evaluated with a Petri net model.

3.9.1 Direct Measurement via PLC
The setup for this method utilizes LogixPro® 500 and a laptop with Windows 7
(64-bit) installed. For each PLC instance, four programs are created. The first program
is the baseline program which executes defined nominal process requirements. The
second is a delta baseline program which also executes defined nominal process
requirements, but is more robust against the application of a specific attack. The third
program is a modified version of the baseline program to simulate application of a
specific attack. The fourth program is a modified version of the delta baseline program to
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simulate the application of the same specific attack previously demonstrated in the third
program.
Both the baseline and delta baseline programs should produce predictable and
valid responses for all input sequences. The third program (attack baseline) should
exhibit degraded or unstable responses as a consequence of the knowledgeable applied
attack. The fourth program, depending on its level of robustness, should exhibit valid or
degraded responses.
The input-output behavior during the execution of the four programs is monitored
and recorded. The derived metrics provide the basis for characterizing the equivalent
Petri nets. Additionally, the number of ladder logic modifications made between each of
the four programs is recorded. These metrics provide the basis for quantifying the
internal modifications made to the PLC programs.

3.9.2

Petri net Analysis

The setup for analysis of the Petri nets uses Platform Independent Petri Net Editor
version 4.0 (PIPEv4.0) and a laptop with Windows 7 installed (32-bit). For each PLC
instance, four equivalent Petri nets are created. The purpose of each Petri net follows the
four programs described in Section 3.9.1.

The input-output behavior during the

simulation of the four Petri nets is monitored and recorded. These metrics provide the
basis for quantifying the external input-output behavior of the PLC programs.
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3.10

Experimental Design
Experimental trials consist of full factorial (without replication) configuration for

the PLC and equivalent Petri nets. The two baseline programs combined with the attacks
of each PLC instance result in four program categories that alter the data/code.


Data/Code
1. Baseline – A program to perform defined process requirements and
generates valid input-output responses.
2. Attack Baseline – A targeted attack to the baseline that generates degraded
or unstable input-output responses.
3. Delta Baseline – A protection scheme applied to the baseline that
generates valid input-output responses. The protection scheme can be
considered equivalent to a fail-safe system state (e.g., flashing red lights
for a roadway stoplight system).
4. Attack Delta Baseline – A targeted attack applied to the delta baseline that
generates valid, degraded or unstable input-output responses.



PLC instances – See Table 6 in Section 3.7 for description of ten PLC
instances.



Methods – Metrics collected from both the PLC and Petri net simulations.

Full factorial experimentation leads to:

4 (program categories) * 10 (PLC

instances) * 2 (methods: PLC/Petri net) = 80 trials
3.11

Summary of Methodology
This chapter provided the goals of the experimentation and detailed the

boundaries and approach. The goals of this research are to identify metrics that may
assess a PLC’s resiliency and applicability as trigger points in real-time hardware
protection schemes. The boundaries of the SUT are the PLC; the CUT is the ladder logic
46

program that executes on the PLC.

The approach consists of emulating ten PLC

instances. Each PLC instance is comprised of four varying program types: baseline,
delta baseline, attack baseline and attack delta baseline. Execution of the PLC instances
occurs in both emulated hardware simulations and equivalent Petri net simulations.
The PLC simulations provide delta ladder logic metrics, and the Petri net
simulations provide delta input-output behavioral metrics. The comparative analysis
performed between all PLC program and Petri net metrics result in six comparative
metrics which form the basis for quantitative analysis to achieve the stated goals:


(baseline – delta baseline)



(baseline – attack baseline)



(baseline – attack delta baseline)



(attack baseline – delta baseline)



(attack baseline – attack delta baseline)



(delta baseline – attack delta baseline)
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IV. Results and Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to document the analysis and results derived from
the behavioral-based characterization process of PLCs.

The primary focus is to

determine the applicability of potential metrics that directly, or indirectly support, the
four characteristics of the resilience framework as documented in Chapter 2. The metrics
are a result of a general stochastic Petri net (GSPN) analysis for each of the Petri nets
derived in Chapter 3.
Section 4.1 documents the results of the GSPN analysis for each of the Petri nets.
Section 4.2 presents corollary analysis of the resulting metrics to identify statistically
relevant observations. Section 4.3 reports the significant findings from the analysis of the
metrics and applicability toward the resilience framework.
4.1

Results of Simulation Scenarios
This section describes the collection and organization of data produced from the

experimentation. The behavioral-based characterization process yields equivalent Petri
nets that facilitate analysis of the PLC input-output behavior. The Petri net simulation
application, PIPEv4.0 (Bonet, 2007), is used to execute a GSPN analysis for each of the
40 Petri nets. The results of the GSPN analysis provide the reachability matrices of each
Petri net.

4.1.1

Derivation of Tangible State Table

A tangible state table is a direct result of the characterization process and
facilitates quantitative analysis. The GSPN analysis module of PIPEv4.0 produces a
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table of states and lists the output characteristics for each state. Table 7 illustrates the
tangible state table for one example baseline PLC instance. Note that analysis for the ten
instances and varying programs are consistent with the example used for discussion.

Table 7: Tangible States for Baseline

The rows represent the tangible states, and columns represent the places that
characterize the output states. The elements of each matrix are marked as 0 or 1, which
represent the absence or presence of a token, respectively.

For example, state M0

represents the Petri net marking in which the place stop deliver is active. The baseline
PLC for this instance comprises eight distinct states.

4.1.2 Derivation of Reachability Graph
A reachability graph identifies all possible states and interactions for a given Petri
net. PIPEv4.0 provides an analysis module that creates a reachability graph for each Petri
net. Figure 11 illustrates the reachability graph consistent with the baseline PLC instance
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referenced in Table 7. Note that analysis for the ten instances and varying programs are
consistent with the example used for discussion.
In Figure 11, S0 through S7 inherit the output characteristics of M0 through M7,
respectively. The arrows pointing towards a state indicate the Petri net transition required
to reach that state. For example, to transition from state S0 to S1, the transition 2 to 3
must fire. Note that any given state must have at least one enabling transition; similarly
any given state may have more than one enabling transitions.

Figure 11: Reachability Graph for Baseline
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4.1.3

Derivation of Reachability Matrix

A reachability matrix is a combination of results from the tangible state table and
reachability graph. The reachability matrix identifies the output states and enabling input
transitions for all potential markings of a given Petri net.

Table 8 presents the

reachability matrix consistent with tangible state table and reachability graph, presented
in Table 7 and Figure 11, respectively. Note that analysis for the ten instances and
varying programs are consistent with the example used for discussion.

Table 8: Reachable Markings for Baseline
PN
marking

m0

stop deliver

1

deliver
container

m1

m2

m4

m5

m6

1

fill
container

1

stop depart

1

depart silo

1

container
full

1

1

stop ship
ship
container
2 --> 0
2 --> 3
2 --> 10
10 --> 2
10 --> 8
Input
10 --> 11
Transitions
10 --> 26
26 --> 10
26 --> 24
26 --> 27
*input

m7

1

stop fill

Output
Places

m3

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
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1

1

1

The reachability matrix organizes the input-output behavior into a numerical
model that facilitates quantitative analysis. The columns present the potential markings
for a given Petri net. The rows list the potential output behavior and input transitions. A
numeral one in the element of the matrix indicates the specific combination of inputs and
outputs that characterize any given marking for a Petri net. In Table 8, the Petri net
marking m4 is summarized with the output behavior of depart silo and container full.
Marking m4 may only be reached with the firing of either transition 10 to 26 or 26 to 27.

4.1.4 Differentiating Between Reachability Matrices
Differentiating the input-output behaviors between any two PLC programs forms
the basis for analysis of one set of metrics. The net difference between any two PLC
programs is derived by comparing the number of dissimilar markings between each of
their respective reachability matrices. Table 9 presents the reachability matrix for the
attack program for PLC instance #1.

Note that analyses for the ten instances are

consistent with the example used for discussion.
The input transition *input in Tables 8, and 9, denotes transitions in the attack
scenario, which are not represented in the baseline case; *input is important in
differentiating PLC programs from the baseline case. Similarly, as seen in Table 9,
*output-place (e.g., *deliver container) is important in differentiating specific PLC
program cases. Table 9 shows the attack program where *deliver container’s decimal
output value is different than the decimal output value produced by the baseline
program’s deliver container in Table 8.
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Table 9: Reachable Markings for Attack (Instance #1)

PN
marking

m0

stop deliver

1

*deliver
container

m1

m2

m4

m5

m6

1

fill
container

1

stop depart

1

depart silo

1

container
full

1

1

stop ship
ship
container
2 --> 0
2 --> 3
2 --> 10
10 --> 2
10 --> 8
Input
10 --> 11
Transitions
10 --> 26
26 --> 10
26 --> 24
26 --> 27
*input

m7

1

stop fill

Output
Places

m3

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

The net difference is determined via a pair-wise comparison of the programs’
potential markings.

The following algorithm compares the pair-wise behavioral

comparisons between two matrices such as (baseline – attack baseline):
1. Select two matrices, A and B
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2. If the number of potential markings between matrices is unequal, set the
matrix with the highest number of potential markings as matrix A
3. count = the number of potential markings in A
4. maxA = count
5. maxB = number of potential markings in B
6. Set X and Y to zero
7. Compare all input-output parameters of A(mX) to B(mY)
a) If A(mX) == B(mY), X = X + 1, Y = 0, count = count - 1; goto 7
b) If Y < maxB, Y = Y + 1; goto 7
c) If X < maxA, X = X + 1, Y = 0, goto 7
d) Else goto 8
8. Return count

The resulting net difference between the baseline matrix and attack baseline
matrix for PLC instance #1 is one. Table 10 presents the differences between each of the
four program categories. For example, there are no observable differences in the inputoutput behavior between the following program pairings: (baseline – delta baseline),
(baseline – attack delta baseline), and (delta baseline – attack delta baseline). There is
exactly one observable difference between the remaining pairings.

Table 10: Net Difference in Input-Output Behavior (Instance #1)
baseline attack baseline

baseline delta baseline

baseline attack delta baseline

attack baseline delta baseline

attack baseline attack delta baseline

delta baseline attack delta baseline

1

0

0

1

1

0

54

4.1.5

Differentiating Between Ladder Logic

Differentiating the ladder logic between any two PLC programs forms the basis of
analysis for a second set of metrics. The net difference between any two PLC programs
is derived by comparing the number of dissimilar ladder logic symbols between the PLC
programs. Figure 12 illustrates the baseline PLC Ladder Logic for the baseline program
for PLC instance #1. Note that analyses for the ten instances are consistent with the
example used for discussion.

Figure 12: Baseline PLC Ladder Logic
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To find the net difference between the baseline and attack baseline programs for
PLC instance #1, the symbolic ladder logic deltas are counted (both the removal and
addition of a symbol count as one change). For this example there is only one difference;
the symbol for Prox Switch, present in rung 003 of the baseline (Figure 12), is removed
from rung 003 of the attack baseline program in Figure 13. The converse is also true; the
symbol for Prox Switch, absent in rung 003 of the attack program, is added to rung 003 of
the baseline program.

Figure 13: Attack Baseline PLC Ladder Logic for Instance #1

56

Table 11 presents the differences between each of the four program categories.
There are two observable differences in the ladder logic between the program pairings
(baseline – attack delta baseline) and (attack baseline – delta baseline). There is exactly
one observable difference between the remaining pairings.
Table 11: Net Difference in Symbolic Ladder Logic (Instance #1)
baseline attack baseline

baseline delta baseline

baseline attack delta baseline

attack baseline delta baseline

attack baseline attack delta baseline

delta baseline attack delta baseline

1

1

2

2

1

1

4.1.6

Summary of Results

Each of the ten PLC instances specified in Chapter 3 result in 6 pair wise
differentiations of the ladder logic and input-output behavior.

The resulting net

differences for each of the 60 cases are presented in Tables 12 and 13. The ladder logic
programs for all 60 cases are available in Appendix A. Similarly, the state tables,
reachability graphs, and matrices are available in Appendix B.

Table 12: Net Difference in Symbolic Ladder Logic

Instance #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

baseline
- attack
baseline

1
1
1
1
2
3
2
5
6
10

baseline
- delta baseline

1
1
2
2
2
4
2
6
10
12

baseline
- attack delta
baseline

2
0
3
3
4
7
0
7
10
10
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attack baseline
- delta baseline

2
2
3
3
4
7
4
11
6
4

attack baseline
- attack delta
baseline

1
1
2
2
2
4
2
6
4
2

delta baseline
- attack delta
baseline

1
1
1
1
2
3
2
5
2
2

Table 13: Net Difference in Input-Output Behavior

Instance #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

baseline
- attack
baseline

baseline
- delta baseline

1
6
4
3
4
7
5
8
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

baseline
- attack delta
baseline

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0

attack baseline
- delta baseline

1
6
4
3
4
7
5
8
1
1

attack baseline
- attack delta
baseline

1
6
4
3
4
7
5
8
4
1

delta baseline
- attack delta
baseline

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0

The results of the ladder logic and input-output differentiation provide the basis
for identifying quantitative metrics that support the resiliency framework. The results of
these comparisons are analyzed for correlation between ladder logic deltas and inputoutput behavior deltas. Testing for correlation determines the delta ladder logic dictates
the outcome of the input-output behavior deltas.

The significant findings are then

assessed against the resiliency framework to determine their applicability in potential
real-time hardware solutions.
4.2

Analysis of Results
The data presented in Tables 12 and 13 represent two sets of metrics that measure

the observable differences between PLC programs. The purpose of this section is to
identify which, if any, of the metrics is most applicable to the resilience framework.
Analysis for correlation is performed between the ladder logic and input-output behavior.
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Then observations between any correlation and the differentiation tables are listed. The
result is a subset of metrics that are most applicable to the resilience framework.

4.2.1

Scatter Plot of Results

The deltas in ladder logic and input-output behavior are visually tested for
correlation in R. Figure 14 illustrates a scatter plot of the 60 data points derived from the
data in Tables 12 and 13. For example, PLC instance #5, (baseline – attack), generates
the point (2, 4) on the scatter plot. Upon visual inspection, no apparent correlation
between delta for ladder logic and input-output behavior exist. Note that there are less
than 60 data points visible on Figure 14 due to overlap of several data points.

Figure 14: Scatter Plot Between Ladder Logic and I/O Deltas
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4.2.2

Smooth Densities Plot of Results

A secondary plot to test for possible correlation is performed with the smooth
density function of R. The smooth density function aids in visualizing any potential
correlation within the overlapped data points (Figure 15). Upon visual inspection, a
dense region exists at around the points (2, 0) and (2, 4). The remainder of the plot is
similar to Figure 14 in that no other apparent correlations are visible.
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Figure 15: Scatter Plot Revealing Overlap Densities

The dense regions around the points (2, 0) and (2, 4) conflict one another and
suggests that the differences of input-output behavior are independent from the
differences in the ladder logic. This finding suggests that the delta ladder logic alone is
insufficient in determining the input-output deltas of the PLC. The remaining regions of
the density plot suggest no other observations to confirm or refute the previous
suggestion. Visual inspection is useful in identifying consistent trends, but since this is
absent in the plots a mathematical correlation of the data points is executed in R.

4.2.3

Correlation Results

A useful method to assess correlation between a set of variables is Spearman’s
rank order coefficient.

Spearman’s method of correlation is preferred over other

methods, such as Pearson’s, due to the non-linear patterns observed in the scatter plots
(Bolboaca, 2006). The value for Spearman’s rank order coefficient ranges from -1 to 1;
values close to zero suggests no correlation exists between the variables and values close
to ±1 suggests a corollary relationship exists.
Equation 1: Spearman’s Rank Order Coefficient

Equation 1 defines Spearman’s rank order coefficient, ρ, where:
di = difference in paired ranks
n = number of cases
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Applying R’s Spearman correlation function to the data set resulted in ρ = 0.14; pvalue = 0.3015. The ρ value suggests there is very little correlation between the deltas in
ladder logic and the deltas of input-output behavior; however, the p-value of 0.3015
implies weak confidence in this hypothesis. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected beyond a confidence threshold of p = 0.30. Investigating the cause of the weak
p-value reveals that the sample size of cases, n, is the root cause.
Spearman’s ρ indicates a statistically weak correlation between the delta ladder
logic and delta input-output data. This supports the visual observation of the plots which
strongly suggests the relationship between the deltas in ladder logic and input-output
behavior is strongly independent of one another. This result supports the assertion that
no correlation exists between the two sets of metrics.

This assertion is applied to

additional observations that further refine the applicability of the metrics to the resilience
framework.

4.2.4

Observations from Differentiation Tables and Correlation Analysis

Key observations from the correlation analysis and differentiation tables identify
the most relevant subset of metrics which are applicable to the resilience framework. The
net difference in ladder logic is a derivative of a PLC’s internal characteristics which
does not consistently quantify physical changes to the PLC’s external state. Conversely,
the net difference of input-output behavior is a derivative of a PLC’s external
characteristics which consistently quantifies external physical states. This distinction
between the two metrics suggests the most significant metric resulting from the
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experiments is the difference observed between the PLC programs’ and instances’ inputoutput behavior.
Since the input-output behavior metrics are self-sufficient, a focus to identify a
key subset of these metrics is undertaken. Note the assumption asserted in Chapter 3
which states that all instances execute a successful attack that changes the physical inputoutput behavior of the system.

The contribution of the ladder logic metrics as a

complimentary metric is pursued in a latter section. The following are key observations
of the differentiation tables for the input-output behavior (see Table 13):


(baseline – delta baseline) is always equal to zero; this is by design of PLC
instances/programs such that the baseline and delta baseline I/O behavior
are consistent with each other.



(baseline – attack delta baseline) and (delta baseline – attack delta
baseline) are inconclusive; note that these metrics results in zero and nonzero values.



(attack baseline – attack delta baseline) is inconclusive; note that this
metric results in non-zero values for the ten instances; however, an
instance can be created such that this metric results in zero, therefore it is
inconclusive.



(attack baseline – baseline) and (attack baseline – delta baseline) are
conclusive; note that these metrics are always non-zero in the face of a
successful attack and always zero in the face of an unsuccessful attack.

The most important observation is number four. The two metrics (attack baseline
– baseline) and (attack baseline – delta baseline) are identified as the most discerning
metrics in detecting input-output changes caused by successful attacks to the PLC’s
program. While the two metrics are equally discerning, the metric (attack baseline –
delta baseline), is proposed as being more applicable in real-time hardware solutions to
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improve the system’s security posture. The metric, (attack baseline – delta baseline), also
directly addresses two aspects of resiliency (i.e., detecting a change occurrence, and
quantifying the degree of change occurrence) and supports mechanisms to minimize
performance losses due to disruptive events.

4.2.5

Summary of Analysis

Corollary analysis between the ladder logic and input-outputs suggests no direct
correlation exists; therefore, it can be reasoned that the net change of ladder logic within
a PLC program is not a self-sufficient metric to assess a PLCs security performance with
respect to the resilience framework. As suggested by the analysis and observations, the
most significant metrics resulting from the experiments is the difference observed
between the PLC programs’ and instances’ input-output behavior. The metrics, (attack
baseline – baseline) and (attack baseline – delta baseline), exhibit roles both as a selfsufficient metrics and as a complimentary metrics to the deltas in ladder logic. Perhaps
significant, is the finding that the metric, (attack baseline – delta baseline), is applicable
to the resilience framework and potential real-time hardware solutions.
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4.3

Significant Findings
The most significant finding in the analysis of the data is the metric (attack

baseline – delta baseline). Indeed, the corollary analysis and differentiation observations
suggest that this metric directly addresses two aspects of resiliency and supports
mechanisms to minimize performance losses due to disruptive events. As a result of the
metric’s contribution to the resiliency framework, it may have potential application in
real-time hardware solutions to improve a system’s security posture.

This section

presents the applicability to both the resilience framework and real-time hardware
solutions.

4.3.1

Applicability to the Resilience Framework

The following subsections summarize the application of the metric, (attack
baseline – delta baseline), with respect to the four tenants of the resilience framework.

4.3.1.1 Self Awareness and Monitoring
The first tenant of the resilience framework is the ability to anticipate a
potentially disruptive event requires that the system has self-awareness of its baseline
and is able to monitor its current state.
The proposed metric identifies when physical input-output relationships deviate
from its baseline. This metric may support one of two triggering mechanisms:
1. A quantity of deviations exceeding a threshold is identified by count
2. A violation against a whitelist (e.g., any matrix component output value of
attack baseline is deviant)
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4.3.1.2 Absorbing Disruptions
The second tenant of the resilience framework is the ability to absorb potentially
disruptive events requires that the system has mechanisms in place to minimize the
amount, if any, of performance loss.
The proposed metric in combination with the difference in ladder logic changes
may assess a PLC’s ability to absorb disruptive events:
1. If the input-output behavioral difference is zero, then the differences in
ladder logic are treated as complimentary metrics to assess the inherent
robustness of a PLC’s ladder logic program.
2. If the input-output behavioral difference is greater than zero, then the
differences seen in input-output behavior is self-sufficient and may be
utilized to assess the PLC’s overall absorption.

4.3.1.3 Adaptation
The third tenant of the resilience framework, the ability to adapt, requires that the
system has contingencies available that allow for flexible system adjustments to maintain
operational availability.
The proposed metric supports this by providing the triggering mechanisms
necessary to initiate adaptive processes. Either of the triggering mechanisms outlined in
Section 4.3.1.1 may support initiation of the adaptive process. Note that the adaptive
processes may exist external to the PLC (e.g., requiring further coordination with
additional hardware/software).
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4.3.1.4 Recovery
The fourth tenant of the resilience framework is the ability to recover from a
disruptive event requires mechanisms, either automated or manual, that allow the system
to perform functionalities consistent with its baseline.
The proposed metric supports this by providing the triggering mechanisms
necessary to initiate recovery processes. Either of the triggering mechanisms outlined in
Section 4.3.1.1 may support initiation of the recovery process. Note that the recovery
processes may exist external to the PLC (e.g., requiring further coordination with
additional hardware or software).

4.3.2

Applicability to Real-Time Hardware Solutions

The metric’s applicability to the resiliency framework cooperates well with
potential real-time hardware solutions. This is an important notion because the protection
mechanism may be an external, and preferably, parallel process. For example, Figure 16
illustrates a high-level Petri net that utilizes the input-output behavioral metric as the
primary means of monitoring and detecting state security. The Petri net also illustrates
architecture which supports absorptive, adaptive, and recovery features that are triggered
when the metric (attack baseline – delta baseline) exceeds a threshold count delta or
upon detection of deviant matrix values.
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Figure 16: High-Level Petri Net Utilizing I/O Analysis (Nominal Operation)

The primary PLC executes the baseline program; however, the secondary
protective PLC executes the delta baseline program and is isolated from direct
communication links to the SCADA network. If deviation from expected behavior is
detected, the primary PLC is prevented from contributing to the input-output state of the
system, and the secondary PLC triggers a fail-safe operation. Figure 16 shows the system
in nominal operation where the subnet for the primary PLC controls process flow;
however, a deviation of input-output behavior as seen in Figure 17 transfers control of
process flow to the subnet of the secondary PLC.

4.3.3 Summary of Findings
The metric (attack baseline – delta baseline) is the most significant result from the
analysis of the data. The application to the resilience framework directly addresses two
tenants (i.e., monitor and absorb), and supports the remaining two tenants (i.e., adapt and
recover). A method of application is as a triggering mechanism which translates well
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towards applications for potential real-time hardware solutions. An example high-level
Petri net architecture is presented that utilizes the metric as the primary mechanism to
transfer between nominal and safe operating modes.

Figure 17: High-Level Petri Net Utilizing I/O Analysis (Safe-Mode Triggered)

4.4

Summary of Results and Analysis
The results in this chapter produced a quantitative means to assess the data

generated from the Petri nets characterized from the PLC instances and programs. The
formation of the differentiation matrices forms the basis for the set of metrics that can
assess the performance of a PLC with respect to the resiliency framework. Analysis of
the matrices suggests that the most significant metric is (attack baseline – delta baseline).
This metric has direct applications to the resilience framework and subsequently to
potential real-time hardware solutions.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter summarizes the research effort and proposes considerations for
future research. Section 5.1 presents a summary of the research goals and approach.
Section 5.2 discusses considerations that progress the significant findings of this research.
Section 5.3 provides concluding remarks.
5.1

Research Summary
The primary goal of this research is to identify metrics that may assess a PLC’s

resilience against malicious exploits. The complimentary goal of this research is to
identify metrics that may be applicable as mechanisms for triggers that allow real-time
hardware implementation.

The experimental method to derive substantial metrics

consisted of creating PLC instances, modeling equivalent Petri nets, and comparatively
analyzing the data. The following sections discuss the experimental methodology, data
analysis and effectiveness of meeting the research goals for this research effort.

5.1.1 Summary of Experimental Methodology
The experimental methodology presented in this research used a set of defined
PLC instances that comprised of four versions of a baseline ladder logic program. The
purpose is to emulate a variety of attacks that result in effectively altering the baseline
performance of the PLC. The four baseline programs include:


Baseline program – Executes nominal system processes



Attack baseline program – Modifies baseline ladder logic; alters nominal
system process execution
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Delta baseline program – Executes nominal system processes; robust against
attack



Attack delta baseline program – Modifies delta baseline ladder logic; may
alter nominal system process execution

The input-output behavior of the programs during execution are observed and
characterized into Petri nets. Non-deterministic simulation of the Petri nets generated the
data necessary for the comparative analysis.

5.1.2

Summary of Analysis

Analysis of the Petri nets resulted in reachability matrices for each program.
Differentiation between the matrices provided a summary of observable outcomes
between the pair-wise analyses of reachability matrices. The pair-wise comparisons
between the four program types comprise the six metrics of interest:


(baseline – delta baseline)



(baseline – attack baseline)



(baseline – attack delta baseline)



(attack baseline – delta baseline)



(attack baseline – attack delta baseline)



(delta baseline – attack delta baseline)

Two metrics, (attack baseline – baseline) and (attack baseline – delta baseline),
are the most discerning metrics in detecting input-output modifications caused by
successful attacks to a PLC’s program. Of these two metrics, (attack baseline – delta
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baseline), is proposed as having the most significant contributions to both the resilient
framework and to real-time hardware applications.

5.1.3

Summary of Meeting Goals

The metric, (attack baseline – delta baseline), is determined to be most applicable
to the research goals. The metric allows for self awareness by enabling the detection of
deviations from nominal input-output state behavior. The metric may also quantify the
absorptive performance of PLCs. Finally, the metric supports the adaptive, and recovery,
qualities of resilience and it may enable potential mechanisms for triggers in real-world
hardware applications.
5.2

Future Work
This section proposes three topics that may progress the findings from this

research. The proposals include real-time hardware execution, benchmark utilization and
an alternate view for the Petri net modeling of processes.

5.2.1

Real-time Application of Metrics in Hardware

The metric, (delta baseline – attack baseline), may be applicable to real-time
hardware solutions to improve SCADA security. At the micro-level, it can be applied to
PLCs identified as critical nodes of the system. Application of the metric requires that an
additional hardware device operate concurrently with the baseline PLC. The additional
hardware device would execute nominal processes exactly the same as the baseline;
however, it implements additional logic that may trigger protective actions. The trigger
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is initiated when a delta between the input-output characteristics of the baseline PLC and
additional hardware is detected.

Potential issues that may arise in real-world

experimentation are related to timing delays between the two devices. This is due to the
synchronous differentiation that the metric, (delta baseline – attack baseline), leverages.
The potential for false negatives (e.g., attack to baseline not detected properly) is
unlikely; however, false positives may result in excessive triggering of the protective
actions.

5.2.2

Enhancing Benchmark Tools for Resilience

The metric, (delta baseline – attack baseline), provides a triggering mechanism to
quantify changes to a system. This result may be integrated with the resilience curve
presented by Wei (2009). The ability to measure aspects of the resilient curve is directly
applicable to other work based on benchmarking tools for assessing resilience in systems
(Almeida, 2010). The findings from this research for detecting change and quantifying
absorptive rates between PLCs may apply to assessing resilience of similar systems at a
micro-level benchmark. Finally, the application of the metric as a triggering mechanism
may apply to assessing the adaptive and recovery aspects of resilience in a macro-level
benchmark.

5.2.3

Alternate Experimentation Method Strictly Utilizing Petri Nets

Petri nets offer a powerful method of modeling and analyzing system processes
(Peterson, 1981). SCADA system processes are deterministic in that they exhibit defined
state boundaries; however, there exists an infinite sequence of state execution within the
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boundaries.

Non-deterministic analysis of Petri nets for a defined state space may

provide an efficient method of modeling systems that execute discrete input-output states
(Peng, 2004).
The method used in this research defined PLC programs prior to characterization
into Petri nets.

An alternate method is to solely define Petri nets as the basis for

representing potential PLC instances.

This facilitates the creation of a magnitude

(complexity and quantity) of PLC instances which may result in more significant
statistical analysis. Automating the generation and analysis of Petri nets would also
eliminate potential sources of human error; the method utilized in this research consisted
of several manual processes where human error is likely to be introduced.
5.3

Concluding Remarks
The behavioral-based method provides a practical means of assessing the security

posture of a PLC against malicious code. The research demonstrates the means to
quantify resiliency on the basis of monitoring, detecting, and absorbing intentional
malicious actions. The ability to analyze the system in real-time, for nonconforming
behavior at the PLC, enables security solutions for detecting and mitigating attacks at the
system end points. Indeed, deriving metrics from input-out characterization incorporates
a true representation of system state that cannot be deceived via alteration at the HMI or
communication channel. This proposed method provides a measure of PLC performance
against malicious code and provides a baseline for quantitative analysis of the security
posture. Examining security at the micro level by focusing on field device and system
functions provides a means for addressing and preparing for future Stuxnet-like attacks.
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Appendix A
Baseline Program
Figure 18 illustrates the baseline program ladder logic and Figure 19 shows the
baseline Petri net for all ten instances.

Figure 18: Ladder Logic for Baseline (all)
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Figure 19: Petri Net for Baseline (all)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 19 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {ship container (21)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}
76



I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {ship container (21)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 1
Figure 20 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 21 shows
the Petri net for instance 1.

Figure 20: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (1)
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Figure 21: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (1)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 21 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {*deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(10 to 2) = {ship container (21)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}
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I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {ship container (21)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 2
Figure 22 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 23 shows
the Petri net for instance 2.

Figure 22: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (2)
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Figure 23: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (2)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 23 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, *container full,
*depart silo, stop depart}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 24, 26 to 27,
reset}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 24) = {*depart silo (14)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}
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I(reset) = {*depart silo (14), *container full (14)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 26) = {*depart silo (14), *container full (14)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {*depart silo (14)}



O(reset) = {stop deliver (0)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 3
Figure 24 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 25 shows
the Petri net for instance 3.

Figure 24: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (3)
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Figure 25: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (3)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 25 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 3) = {*stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {ship container (21)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



I(reset) = {ship container (20)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}
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O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {ship container (21)}



O(reset) = {*stop deliver (0)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 4
Figure 26 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 27 shows
the Petri net for instance 4.

Figure 26: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (4)
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Figure 27: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (4)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 27 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {*ship container (31)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}
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I(26 to 10) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



I(26 to 24) = {*depart silo (31)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



O(10 to 26) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



O(26 to 10) = {*ship container (31)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {*depart silo (31)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 5
Figure 28 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 29 shows
the Petri net for instance 5.

Figure 28: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (5)
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Figure 29: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (5)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 29 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(10 to 2) = {*ship container (31)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}
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I(26 to 10) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



I(26 to 24) = {*depart silo (31)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



O(10 to 26) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



O(26 to 10) = {*ship container (31)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {*depart silo (31)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 6
Figure 30 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 31 shows
the Petri net for instance 6.

Figure 30: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (6)
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Figure 31: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (6)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 31 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(10 to 2) = {*ship container (31)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



I(reset) = {*ship container (31)}



O(2 to 3) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {*deliver container (15)}
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O(10 to 26) = {*depart silo (31), *container full (30)}



O(26 to 10) = {*ship container (31)}



O(reset) = {*stop deliver (0)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 7
Figure 32 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 33 shows
the Petri net for instance 7.

Figure 32: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (7)
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Figure 33: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (7)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 33 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {*fill container (15)}



I(10 to 8) = {*fill container (15)}
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I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {*fill container (15)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {*fill container (15)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 8
Figure 34 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 35 shows
the Petri net for instance 8.

Figure 34: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (8)
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Figure 35: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (8)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 35 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 3) = {*stop deliver (0)}



I(reset) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(2 to 3) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(reset) = {*stop deliver (0)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 9
Figure 36 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 37 shows
the Petri net for instance 9.

Figure 36: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (9)
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Figure 37: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (9)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 37 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 2) = {*ship container (31)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}
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I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {deliver container (5)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), *ship container (31)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {*ship container (31)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}
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Attack Baseline Program for Instance 10
Figure 38 illustrates the attack baseline program ladder logic and Figure 39 shows
the Petri net for instance 10.
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Figure 38: Ladder Logic for Attack Baseline (10)

Figure 39: Petri Net for Attack Baseline (10)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 39 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {*deliver container (15)}



I(10 to 2) = {ship container (21)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}
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I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 2) = {*deliver container (15)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0), stop ship (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14), ship container (21)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {ship container (21)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 1
Figure 40 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 1. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 40: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (1)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 2
Figure 41 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 2. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 41: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (2)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 3
Figure 42 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 3. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 42: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (3)

109

Delta Baseline Program for Instance 4
Figure 43 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 4. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 43: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (4)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 5
Figure 44 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 5. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 44: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (5)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 6
Figure 45 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 6. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 45: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (6)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 7
Figure 46 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 7. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 46: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (7)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 8
Figure 47 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 8. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 47: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (8)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 9
Figure 48 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 9. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 48: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (9)
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Delta Baseline Program for Instance 10
Figure 49 illustrates the delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 10. The
equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 49: Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (10)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 1
Figure 50 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 1.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 50: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (1)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 2
Figure 51 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 2.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 51: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (2)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 3
Figure 52 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 3.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 52: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (3)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 4
Figure 53 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 4.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 53: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (4)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 5
Figure 54 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 5.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 54: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (5)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 6
Figure 55 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 6.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 55: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (6)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 7
Figure 56 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 7.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 56: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (7)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 8
Figure 57 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 8.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 57: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (8)
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 9
Figure 58 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic and Figure 59
shows the Petri net for instance 9.

Figure 58: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (9)
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Figure 59: Petri Net for Attack Delta Baseline (9)

The formal definition for the Petri net illustrated in Figure 77 is C = {P, T, I, O},
such that:


P = {deliver container, stop deliver, fill container, stop fill, container full,
depart silo, stop depart, ship container, stop ship}



T = {2 to 0, 2 to 3, 2 to 10, 10 to 2, 10 to 8, 10 to 11, 10 to 26, 26 to 10, 26 to
24, 26 to 27}



I(2 to 0) = {deliver container (5)}



I(2 to 3) = {stop deliver (0)}



I(2 to 10) = {deliver container (5)}



I(10 to 8) = {fill container (14)}



I(10 to 11) = {stop fill (0)}



I(10 to 26) = {fill container (14)}



I(26 to 10) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}
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I(26 to 24) = {depart silo (21)}



I(26 to 27) = {stop depart (0)}



I(reset) = {stop ship (0), *ship container (11)}



O(2 to 0) = {stop deliver (0)}



O(2 to 3) = {deliver container (5)}



O(2 to 10) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 8) = {stop fill (0)}



O(10 to 11) = {fill container (14)}



O(10 to 26) = {depart silo (21), container full (20)}



O(26 to 10) = {stop ship (0), *ship container (11)}



O(26 to 24) = {stop depart (0)}



O(26 to 27) = {depart silo (21)}



O(reset) = {stop deliver (0)}
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Attack Delta Baseline Program for Instance 10
Figure 60 illustrates the attack delta baseline program ladder logic for instance 10.
The equivalent Petri net is similar to the baseline program shown in Figure 19.

Figure 60: Attack Ladder Logic for Delta Baseline (10)
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Appendix B
Baseline Program
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of:


The baseline program for PLC instances 1 through 10



The delta baseline program for PLC instances 1 through 10



The attack delta baseline program for PLC instances 1 through 8, and 10

Table 14: Tangible States for Baseline (all), Delta Baseline (all) and Attack Delta Baseline (1-8, 10)

Figure 61: Graph for Baseline (1-10), Delta Baseline (1-10) and Attack Delta Baseline (1-8,10)
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Table 15: Matrix for Baseline (1-10), Delta Baseline (1-10) and Attack Delta Baseline (1-8,10)
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1

10 --> 26

1
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1

26 --> 27

1
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Attack Delta Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 9)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack delta baseline program for PLC instance 9.

Table 16: Tangible States for Attack Delta Baseline (9)

Figure 62: Graph for Attack Delta Baseline (9)
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Table 17: Matrix for Attack Delta Baseline (9)
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1

1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 1)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 1.

Table 18: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (1)

Figure 63: Graph for Attack Baseline (1)
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Table 19: Matrix for Attack Baseline (1)
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1

1
1

1

1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 2)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 2.

Table 20: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (2)

Figure 64: Graph for Attack Baseline (2)
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Table 21: Matrix for Attack Baseline (2)
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1

1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 3)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 3.

Table 22: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (3)

Figure 65: Graph for Attack Baseline (3)
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Table 23: Matrix for Attack Baseline (3)
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1
1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 4)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 4.

Table 24: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (4)

Figure 66: Graph for Attack Baseline (4)
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Table 25: Matrix for Attack Baseline (4)
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1
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1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 5)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 5.

Table 26: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (5)

Figure 67: Graph for Attack Baseline (5)
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Table 27: Matrix for Attack Baseline (5)
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1
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1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 6)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 6.

Table 28: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (6)

Figure 68: Graph for Attack Baseline (6)
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Table 29: Matrix for Attack Baseline (6)
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Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 7)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 7.

Table 30: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (7)

Figure 69: Graph for Attack Baseline (7)
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Table 31: Matrix for Attack Baseline (7)
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1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 8)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 8.
Table 32: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (8)

Figure 70: Graph for Attack Baseline (8)
Table 33: Matrix for Attack Baseline (8)
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1

Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 9)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 9.

Table 34: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (9)

Figure 71: Graph for Attack Baseline (9)
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Table 35: Matrix for Attack Baseline (9)
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Attack Baseline Program (for PLC Instance 10)
The following state table, reachability graph and matrix are representative of
attack baseline program for PLC instance 10.

Table 36: Tangible States for Attack Baseline (10)

Figure 72: Graph for Attack Baseline (10)
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Table 37: Matrix for Attack Baseline (10)
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